"Whether Trump ultimately 'goes to Tehran' depends less on intent than on calculation. The question is not whether force will be used, but whether Iran can make the cost of using it intolerably high."
This state of affairs is like an asymmetrical, unstable and unpredictable version of Cold War nuclear deterrence.
On the one side Iran would seem to have achieved the capacity to deter American regime change despite lacking the nuclear means of deterrence. This is an inherently unstable situation, since President Trump’s particular antagonism to Iran's nuclear program, and America's broader geostrategic commitment to Israel’s strength in the region will continue to motivate American pressure on Iran but, short of decisive military intervention, American threats will surely continue to be met by Iranian counter threats.
Since American nuclear capacity provides a superiority over Iran that prevents the anxious stability of the Cold War's Mutually Assured Destruction, such an atmosphere of threats and counter-threats does not encourage restraint on America's part.
The longer the presently heightened atmosphere lasts, the higher the danger. Real asymmetry of power and rhetorical sabre-rattling produce ambiguities of intention and perception, while American toughness and resolve may fall prey to the American crusade impulse. Ongoing instability also increases the risk of either side resorting to premature aggression, not to mention making errors of judgement under strain.
On the American side, President Trump’s attitude to Iran is perfectly consistent with what Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon have called America's 40-year obsession with its Iranian "great Satan." But since the dynamics of intention and calculation in Trump’s foreign policy are rather obscure , the traditional American animus toward Iran has already been expressed in drastic projections of American power under Trump - the bombing of Iranian nuclear sites last year being the most aggressive (but not obviously the most successful) example.
If forewarning Trump that the cost of "going to Tehran" will be intolerably high results in Trump recognizing the danger of catalysing massive regional turbulence, a prudent president would of course pull back.
But it's not the easiest thing to imagine the current American president accepting that temperance has been forced upon him by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Even harder to imagine that relenting temporarily would lead Trump to develop an interest in a policy of ongoing strategic restraint.
Thank you for this thoughtful and well-argued comment. I largely agree with your framing of the current moment as an unstable, asymmetrical deterrence environment. Where I would slightly shift the emphasis is on how President Trump appears to be reading the balance of power right now. From Trump’s perspective, this is not a stalemate but a moment of maximum leverage. In his calculation, Iran’s regional arms have been severely cut, its nuclear program has been damaged or at least significantly disrupted, and its domestic legitimacy is arguably at its lowest point in decades. In crude but revealing terms, Trump seems to believe he has Iran “by the throat”—or, more bluntly, that Iran has no viable options left except surrender.
This is what makes the current moment a golden opportunity in Trump’s eyes: not for regime change through invasion, but for forcing a deal that amounts to full capitulation—ending Iran’s nuclear ambitions, sharply limiting its missile program, and dismantling its regional posture. In Trump’s worldview, pressure works best when the opponent appears cornered and exhausted. He believes escalation now will not trigger balance, but submission.
The irony—and this is the core of the tragedy—is that Iran cannot accept such a deal without triggering its own gradual dissolution from within. A settlement that strips the regime of its ideological narrative, its regional deterrence, and its claim to resistance would hollow out its domestic base and accelerate internal fragmentation. From Tehran’s perspective, this is not compromise; it is delayed collapse.
That is why Iran’s choices are so stark and so dangerous. If it accepts Trump’s terms, it risks slow internal erosion. If it refuses and cannot reestablish credible deterrence, it risks escalating destruction. And if it sees no survivable path in either direction, the temptation toward what you rightly describe as premature aggression—or even strategic “suicide”—increases.
This is also where I agree with your concern about asymmetry. The absence of mutual assured destruction removes a stabilising ceiling on American behaviour. U.S. superiority, combined with ideological hostility toward Iran and unwavering commitment to Israel’s security, encourages continued pressure rather than restraint. Threats and counter-threats become a permanent condition, raising the risk of miscalculation, emotional decision-making, or symbolic escalation spiraling into real war.
At the same time, I would add that this asymmetry cuts both ways. Iran’s inability to accept imposed restraint does not mean it lacks agency; it means its agency is being exercised under existential pressure. That is precisely the condition in which states historically take the most dangerous risks.
So I agree with your final concern: if the current heightened atmosphere persists, the danger grows—not because either side wants catastrophe, but because the structure of the situation rewards escalation and punishes restraint. The question, then, is not simply whether Trump can be convinced that “going to Tehran” would be intolerably costly, but whether the system itself allows either side to step back without appearing to concede survival.
In that sense, this is not just an unstable version of deterrence—it is a test of whether coercion without collapse is even possible when one side believes the other has already lost.
I'm grateful for this expansion of your analysis and argument, and I appreciate your acute attention to the remarks I'd made.
On Iran's side, I think your summation here is exactly right: "From Tehran’s perspective, this is not compromise; it is delayed collapse. That is why Iran’s choices are so stark and so dangerous"
On the American side, your evocation of President Trump's confidence that that he has Iran "by the throat" brought to mind another unpropitious parallel from Cold War history. In the 1950s, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was famously bellicose in his rhetoric about absolute superiority over the Soviet Union. But at least some of this bellicosity was clearly calculated to create effect. More to the point, Dulles wasn't the president, and had President Eisenhower as a superior and balancing (if not dampening) force. Today the absolute confidence of the American president not only lacks a superior (or subordinate, or peer) moderating influence, but also seems to proceed in combinations of rhetorical and real rashness that are anything but calculating.
Thank you for your frequent, in-depth and acute assessments of these matters.
An interesting concluding prospect:
"Whether Trump ultimately 'goes to Tehran' depends less on intent than on calculation. The question is not whether force will be used, but whether Iran can make the cost of using it intolerably high."
This state of affairs is like an asymmetrical, unstable and unpredictable version of Cold War nuclear deterrence.
On the one side Iran would seem to have achieved the capacity to deter American regime change despite lacking the nuclear means of deterrence. This is an inherently unstable situation, since President Trump’s particular antagonism to Iran's nuclear program, and America's broader geostrategic commitment to Israel’s strength in the region will continue to motivate American pressure on Iran but, short of decisive military intervention, American threats will surely continue to be met by Iranian counter threats.
Since American nuclear capacity provides a superiority over Iran that prevents the anxious stability of the Cold War's Mutually Assured Destruction, such an atmosphere of threats and counter-threats does not encourage restraint on America's part.
The longer the presently heightened atmosphere lasts, the higher the danger. Real asymmetry of power and rhetorical sabre-rattling produce ambiguities of intention and perception, while American toughness and resolve may fall prey to the American crusade impulse. Ongoing instability also increases the risk of either side resorting to premature aggression, not to mention making errors of judgement under strain.
On the American side, President Trump’s attitude to Iran is perfectly consistent with what Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon have called America's 40-year obsession with its Iranian "great Satan." But since the dynamics of intention and calculation in Trump’s foreign policy are rather obscure , the traditional American animus toward Iran has already been expressed in drastic projections of American power under Trump - the bombing of Iranian nuclear sites last year being the most aggressive (but not obviously the most successful) example.
If forewarning Trump that the cost of "going to Tehran" will be intolerably high results in Trump recognizing the danger of catalysing massive regional turbulence, a prudent president would of course pull back.
But it's not the easiest thing to imagine the current American president accepting that temperance has been forced upon him by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Even harder to imagine that relenting temporarily would lead Trump to develop an interest in a policy of ongoing strategic restraint.
Thank you for this thoughtful and well-argued comment. I largely agree with your framing of the current moment as an unstable, asymmetrical deterrence environment. Where I would slightly shift the emphasis is on how President Trump appears to be reading the balance of power right now. From Trump’s perspective, this is not a stalemate but a moment of maximum leverage. In his calculation, Iran’s regional arms have been severely cut, its nuclear program has been damaged or at least significantly disrupted, and its domestic legitimacy is arguably at its lowest point in decades. In crude but revealing terms, Trump seems to believe he has Iran “by the throat”—or, more bluntly, that Iran has no viable options left except surrender.
This is what makes the current moment a golden opportunity in Trump’s eyes: not for regime change through invasion, but for forcing a deal that amounts to full capitulation—ending Iran’s nuclear ambitions, sharply limiting its missile program, and dismantling its regional posture. In Trump’s worldview, pressure works best when the opponent appears cornered and exhausted. He believes escalation now will not trigger balance, but submission.
The irony—and this is the core of the tragedy—is that Iran cannot accept such a deal without triggering its own gradual dissolution from within. A settlement that strips the regime of its ideological narrative, its regional deterrence, and its claim to resistance would hollow out its domestic base and accelerate internal fragmentation. From Tehran’s perspective, this is not compromise; it is delayed collapse.
That is why Iran’s choices are so stark and so dangerous. If it accepts Trump’s terms, it risks slow internal erosion. If it refuses and cannot reestablish credible deterrence, it risks escalating destruction. And if it sees no survivable path in either direction, the temptation toward what you rightly describe as premature aggression—or even strategic “suicide”—increases.
This is also where I agree with your concern about asymmetry. The absence of mutual assured destruction removes a stabilising ceiling on American behaviour. U.S. superiority, combined with ideological hostility toward Iran and unwavering commitment to Israel’s security, encourages continued pressure rather than restraint. Threats and counter-threats become a permanent condition, raising the risk of miscalculation, emotional decision-making, or symbolic escalation spiraling into real war.
At the same time, I would add that this asymmetry cuts both ways. Iran’s inability to accept imposed restraint does not mean it lacks agency; it means its agency is being exercised under existential pressure. That is precisely the condition in which states historically take the most dangerous risks.
So I agree with your final concern: if the current heightened atmosphere persists, the danger grows—not because either side wants catastrophe, but because the structure of the situation rewards escalation and punishes restraint. The question, then, is not simply whether Trump can be convinced that “going to Tehran” would be intolerably costly, but whether the system itself allows either side to step back without appearing to concede survival.
In that sense, this is not just an unstable version of deterrence—it is a test of whether coercion without collapse is even possible when one side believes the other has already lost.
I'm grateful for this expansion of your analysis and argument, and I appreciate your acute attention to the remarks I'd made.
On Iran's side, I think your summation here is exactly right: "From Tehran’s perspective, this is not compromise; it is delayed collapse. That is why Iran’s choices are so stark and so dangerous"
On the American side, your evocation of President Trump's confidence that that he has Iran "by the throat" brought to mind another unpropitious parallel from Cold War history. In the 1950s, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was famously bellicose in his rhetoric about absolute superiority over the Soviet Union. But at least some of this bellicosity was clearly calculated to create effect. More to the point, Dulles wasn't the president, and had President Eisenhower as a superior and balancing (if not dampening) force. Today the absolute confidence of the American president not only lacks a superior (or subordinate, or peer) moderating influence, but also seems to proceed in combinations of rhetorical and real rashness that are anything but calculating.
Thank you for your frequent, in-depth and acute assessments of these matters.